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1. Introduction
This working paper reports on some preliminary ideas concerning a
mathematical model for income inequality. This corresponds to a sit-
uation where workers do not own capital stock – or, more realistically,
where the share of capital owned by the top 1% dwarfs the share owned
by the rest of the society. In other words, the factor shares ratio should
be able to explain the proportion of income of the top 1% (and more-
over, the top 0.1%) to the rest of income earners.
This paper comprises the following sections: Section 2 contextualises
our research by discussing the recent research in Piketty (2014). Section
3 derives a simple mathematical model for the basic relation between
a generalised inequality coefficient and economic development.
2. Piketty’s context
Piketty (2014) aims to explain the significant shifts in income inequality
since the Industrial Revolution. His explanation involves both shifts in
the shares of income going to different factors of production and shifts
in the ownership of those factors. Here we will summarise his expla-
nation as to why income inequality first decreased and then increased
uniformly across the developed world. In doing so we’ll describe why
he believes that capitalist economies tend towards increased inequality
and so contextualise our own policy analysis.
Piketty shows that the ratios of capital to income have shifted sig-
nificantly since the 19th century. In 1870 Britain, capital was worth
almost 700% of national income (Piketty, 2014, Technical Appendix
Table SI.2). By the end of World War Two it was only worth 313%,
and by 2010 it had rebounded to 522%. These shifts are representative
of trends across the West because the shocks that caused them – ideo-
logical, military, economic – were as well. From our perspective, their
importance comes from their relationship to shifts in the proportion of
income going to capital (Piketty, 2014, p. 220). While an increasing
capital stock will reduce the marginal product of capital and so reduce
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interest rates, according to Piketty, this effect will not be sufficiently
strong to keep capitalists’ share of income constant. In more technical
terms, Piketty believes the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labour is greater than 1.
In modern developed economies wage income is correlated with capi-
tal income – many of the top 1% of wage earners are in the top 1%
of capital owners (Piketty, 2014, pp. 254 - 255). However, capital
is distributed less equally than labour (Piketty, 2014, p. 244). Thus
a greater proportion of income going to capital will increase income
inequality. This justifies using the ratio of capital income to labour in-
come as a measure of inequality, linking Piketty’s functional argument
with his distributive conclusions.
However Piketty doesn’t pretend that functional arguments can explain
all of the shifts in income inequality. As he shows, the distributions
of capital and wages have themselves changed. The increase in wage
inequality is difficult to summarise. It differs significantly between
Anglo-America and Continental Europe, suggesting it is driven more
by labour market institutions and local norms than anything particu-
larly fundamental (Piketty, 2014, ch. 9); also, compare Krawczyk and
Shimomura (2003).
He attributes capital inequality to gaps between the return on capital
and economic growth rates, r − g (Piketty, 2014, ch. 10). Infinite-
horizon macroeconomic models with endogenous savings imply r > g –
were that not the case, consumers would borrow to shift consumption
forward, lifting interest rates as they did so. Piketty, hesitant to place
too much trust in dynamic macroeconomic models, prefers to see r >
g as a historical tendency. Regardless, as the gap between r and g
increases, so too does the importance of old capital over new.1
1He puts it more formally in his technical appendix: the distribution of capital
follows a Pareto law, and “Pareto laws are generated by dynamic process with
multiplicative shocks” (Piketty, 2014, Technical Appendix p. 61). The importance
of these multiplicative shocks increases with r− g. See Piketty and Zucman (2014)
for a fuller exposition. Also, see Judd (1985) for a proof that r = g is optimal long
term in a macrodynamic simple perfect foresight model.
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In our research we will consider how policy can constrain inequality.
We will focus on the functional side, on the ratio of returns to labour
with returns to capital. Further, we assume an elasticity of substitu-
tion = 1. Piketty would contest this assumption so it deserves some
justification. First, elasticities of substitution appear to be lower over
the short term than the longer term – see for example Tipper (2012).
Thus our paper can be thought of as considering Piketty’s questions
over a shorter timeframe. Second, elasticities of substitution change
with technology – a high elasticity of substitution suggests that labour
and capital fulfill essentially the same task and so corresponds a roboti-
cised economy, whereas a low elasticity of substitution suggests that
labour and capital fulfill fundamentally different roles which cannot be
substituted. Thus our paper can be thought of examining the economy
as it is now, and not as it is will be in a roboticised future. Finally, it’s
worth noting that empirical analyses of the elasticity of substitution
have consistently found elasticities less than one, making an elasticity
= 1 a fairly conservative assumption.2 It is the elasticity of substitution
= 1 that implies the Cobb-Douglas production model we use below.
3. Inequality versus economic development
Our model is based on Judd (1985, 1987); Krawczyk and Judd (2015).
Judd (1987) and Krawczyk and Judd (2015) use a model that comprises
a representative producer with a Cobb-Douglas production function
(y = Akα`1−α), an infinitely lived representative household who enjoys
consumption
(
u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ
)
and prefers not to work
(
v(`) = V `
1+η
1+η
)
,
and a government which taxes labour (τ
L
) and capital (τ
L
) to finance
its debt (B) and exogenous spending (g). Depreciation is δ and our
household’s discount rate is ρ. Labour supply and savings are both
endogenous.
3.1. System’s dynamics. The fundamental law of motion for capital
k is determined by net output i.e., y − δk, where y is output and δ >
2For example, see Szeto (2001), Hall and Scobie (2005) and Tipper (2012) for
New Zealand examples.
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0 is the rate of depreciation, diminished by consumption c > 0 and
government expenditure is g ≥ 0. If so and assuming a Cobb-Douglas
type production function for output, we get, in continuous time,
(1)
dk
dt
= Akα`1−α − δk − c− g .
As usual, ` > 0 is labour, A > 0 is total factor productivity and
α ∈ (0, 1) is output elasticity of capital. In this model, expenditure g
is assumed constant but several values of g can be allowed for in the
computations.
The utility of consumption and the disutility of labour of a represen-
tative agent are described by u and v defined above. The coefficients
V, γ, η are positive. If λ > 0 is the private marginal value of capital
at time t, then it follows from maximization of the utility function
u(c)− v(`), on an infinite horizon with the discount rate ρ > 0, that3
(2)
dλ
dt
= λ(ρ− r¯) .
Here, r¯ = (1− τ
K
)
(
∂y
∂k
− δ
)
is the after tax marginal product of cap-
ital, where τ
K
∈ [0, 1] is capital tax. Expanding r¯ in (2) yields
(3)
dλ
dt
= λ
(
ρ− (1− τ
K
)
(
αA
(
`
k
)1−α
− δ
))
.
To characterize the economy at hand, we will also use government debt
B, which grows in g and diminishes with tax T as follows:
(4)
dB
dt
= r¯B − T + g
where, as above, r¯ is the net-of-tax interest rate. In this economy, tax
rates on capital and labour are τ
K
and τ
L
(τ
L
, τ
K
∈ [0, 1]); if so, the
3Except where stated otherwise, all settings in our model are the same as in
Judd (1987), which can also be traced down to Brock and Turnovsky (1981). In
particular, the private marginal value of capital λ (or, agent’s marginal utility of
consumption) is the adjoint state in the perfect-foresight household utility u(c)−v(`)
maximisation problem. Part of its specification is a request for the satisfaction of
the consumers’ transversality condition at infinity. To obtain optimal consumption,
it is sufficient to solve the underlying optimal control problem and use (7).
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expression for total tax T in (4) at time t becomes
T = τ
K
αAkα`1−α + τ
L
(1− α)Akα`1−α(5)
=
(
α(τ
K
− τ
L
) + τ
L
)
Akα`1−α .
Combining the last two expressions results in the following debt dy-
namics
(6)
dB
dt
= r¯B − (α(τ
K
− τ
L
) + τ
L
)
Akα`1−α + g ,
where r¯ will be expanded later. In simple terms, we see that debt can
diminish if output is large or if the tax rates are high (and when output
is not too small).
While the private marginal value of capital, λ, can adequately charac-
terize the consumer’s behavior, it lacks an easy economic interpretation.
We will replace the equation for
dλ
dt
, (2), by a differential equation for
consumption, easily interpretable.
The marginal utility of consumption is
du
dc
=
1
cγ
; and, on the other
hand, λ is the marginal utility of consumption λ =
du
dc
. Hence,
(7) c =
1
λ1/γ
,
which, after differentiation in the time domain, yields
(8)
dc
dt
=
−1
γ
· 1
λ1+1/γ
· dλ
dt
=
−1
γ
c1+γ
dλ
dt
.
Using (3), after some simplifications, we get
(9)
dc
dt
= − c · ρ+ (δ − αAk
α−1 `1−α) (1− τK)
γ
We can see that consumption has a trivial steady state and will grow if
ρ (discount rate) and/or δ (depreciation) are “small” to reach a positive
steady state.
We now want to express labour ` through capital and consumption and
thus “close” the dynamic system (1), (9), (6).
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Let w denote (time-dependent) wages; they equal to the marginal prod-
uct of labour:
(10) w =
dy
d`
=
(1− α)kαA
`α
In equilibrium, the marginal utility of consumption weighted by the
after-tax wages must be equal to the marginal disutility from labour:
(11)
(1− τ
L
)w
cγ
= `ηV .
Substituting wages and solving for labour yields,
(12) ` =
(
(1− τ
L
)(1− α)Akα
cγV
) 1
α+η
,
from which we see that labour can be determined by capital and con-
sumption. Here, we can observe that if γ > α then labour decreases in
consumption faster than it grows in capital.
We now use (12) to substitute labour in (1), (9), (6) and obtain
(13)
dk
dt
=
(
Aη+1 kα (α+η−1)+1
((1− α) (1− τ
L
))
(V cγ)
1−α) 1α+η
−g−k δ−c
(14)
dc
dt
= − c
γ
·
ρ+
δ − α ((1− α) (1− τL)) 1−αα+ηA η+1α+η
k
(α−1)2
α+η (V cγ)1−α
 (1− τ
K
)

dB
dt
=(15)
g − (α τ
K
+ τ
L
(1− α))
(
Aη+1 kα (α+η−1)+1
((1− α) (1− τ
L
))
(V cγ)
1−α) 1α+η
+ k δ τ
K
−B
(
δ − A
η+1
α+η α((1− α) (1− τ
L
))
1−α
α+η
(V cγ)1−αk
(1−α)2
α+η
)
(1− τ
K
)
Allowing for these substitutions informs us, among others, that the sign
of the right hand side of (14) can be negative for significant discount
and depreciation rates. Hence high consumption levels may quickly
diminish. Large consumption will also contribute to a decline of capital
and a rise of debt. However, this multiple downturn could be avoided
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by an “early” (preemptive) drop of taxes on capital. One can see in
Krawczyk and Judd (2015) from which states such a preventive drop
can be efficient.
The three equations of motion (13), (14), (15) jointly constitute the
basic representation of the economy at hand. For this economy, the
loci of economic states (viability kernel) were established in Krawczyk
and Judd (2015), from which moderate tax adjustments can guarantee
a balanced evolution of the economy.
We recognize that this system is nonlinear with multiple steady states.
We can see that, as one would expect, the consumption growth or
decline can be moderated by adjusting the capital tax rate while debt
will (mainly) depend on the labour tax rate. If the rates were identical
(τ
L
= τ
K
), then increasing them/it will slow down the consumption
rate and diminish debt. With high taxation rate, consumption and
debt will naturally diminish and capital will grow. We also notice that
debt will grow very fast for large B and non-excessive capital taxation.
To fully describe the tax model dynamics, the equations (1), (9), (6)
(with (12)) need be completed by two differential inclusions for the two
tax rates τ
L
and τ
K
:
(16)
dτ
L
dt
= u
L
∈ [−d
L
, d
L
] = U
L
and
dτ
K
dt
= u
K
∈ [−d
K
, d
K
] = U
K
where d
L
, d
K
are positive numbers. The inclusions represent bounds
on the speed at which tax rates can change. This corresponds to the
government policy of “smooth” tax rates adjustments determined by
d
L
and d
K
.
In the current version of the model we will assume that the only tax
is a proportional income tax, so the tax rate on labour and capital are
equal i.e., τ
L
= τ
K
= τ . Therefore, the two inclusions in (16) collapse
to
(17)
dτ
dt
= u ∈ [−d, d] = U, d ≥ 0 .
3.2. Single tax. Assuming that τ
L
= τ
K
= τ , the following can be
derived.
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Gross wages:
(18) w = y
L
=
(
Aη(1− α)η(kηV cγ)α
(1− τ)α
) 1
α+η
Net wages:
(19) w¯ = w(1− τ
L
) = (((1− τ)A(1− α))η(kηV cγ)α) 1α+η
Gross labour income share of output:
(20)
lw
y
= 1− α
Net labour income share of output:
(21)
lw¯
y
= (1− α)(1− τ)
Gross return on capital:
(22) r = yk = αA
η+1
α+η
(
(1− α)(1− τ)
kηV cγ
) 1−α
α+η
Net return on capital:
(23) r¯ = (r − δ)(1− τ) = α(A(1− τ)) η+1α+η
(
1− α
kηV cγ
) 1−α
α+η
− δ(1− τ)
Gross capital income share of output:
(24)
kr
y
= α
Net capital income share of output:
(25)
kr¯
y
= α(1− τ)−
(
kη(1− τ)
A
) η+1
α+η
(
V cγ
1− α
) 1−α
α+η
δ
Finally, the ratio of net capital income to net labour income:
(26) χ ≡ kr¯
lw¯
=
α
1− α − δ
((
V cγ
1− τ
)1−α
kη(1−α)(A(1− α))−(η+1)
) 1
α+η
As we explained in Section 2, this ratio correlates with income inequal-
ity. When δ = 0 it simplifies to a constant, suggesting that in a one-tax
model χ depends only on α, the Cobb-Douglas output elasticity.
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3.3. Two tax. When we allow the capital tax rate to differ from the
wage tax rate we derive slightly more complicated expressions.
Gross wages:
(27) w = y
L
=
(
Aη(1− α)η(kηV cγ)α
(1− τ
L
)α
) 1
α+η
Net wages:
(28) w(1− τ
L
) = (((τ
L
− 1)A(α− 1))η(kηV cγ)α) 1α+η
Gross labour income share of output:
(29)
lw
y
= 1− α
Net labour income share of output
(30)
lw(1− τ
L
)
y
= (1− α)(1− τ
L
)
Gross return on capital:
(31) r = yk = αA
η+1
α+η
(
k−η(1− α)(1− τ
L
)
V cγ
) 1−α
α+η
Net return on capital:
(32)
(r− δ)(1− τ
K
) = αA
η+1
α+η
(
k−η(1− α)(1− τ
L
)
V cγ
) 1−α
α+η
(1− τ
K
)− δ(1− τ
K
)
Gross capital income share of output:
(33)
kr
y
= α
Net capital income share of output:
(34)
k(r − δ)(1− τ
K
)
y
= α(1−τ
K
)−
(
kη
A
) η+1
α+η
(
V cγ
(1− α)(1− τ
L
)
) 1−α
α+η
δ(1−τ
K
)
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And again finally the ratio of net capital income to net labour income:
(35)
χ ≡ kr¯
lw¯
=
1− τ
K
1− τ
L
 α
1− α − δ
((
V cγ
1− τ
L
)1−α
kη(1−α)(A(1− α))−(η+1)
) 1
α+η

Note that δ = 0 no longer forces χ to be constant. As one would
expect, greater capital taxation reduces χ and greater labour taxation
increases it.
4. Concluding remarks
It is evident from (35) and, in particular, from (26) that output elas-
ticity of capital is largely responsible for χ. This would predict that χ,
and some of the multiple inequality measures, will be higher in coun-
tries with a large α.4 Obviously, the actual value of χ and the level of
inequality, can be, and is, in real life modified by the taxation policy
and the resulting levels of capital and consumption.
In a companion paper Krawczyk and Townsend (2015) we discuss his-
torical evidence for inequality in New Zealand and its correlation with
χ, which we will refer to as the factor ratio strength or factor ratio for
shortness.
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